Lindsey v. State · 14 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 2009) · No. SC07-1167 · and Lindsey v. State · No. 4D2025-3395 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 21, 2026)
On April 19, 1994, a clerk at a Florida pawn shop was shot to death in the back room. Twelve years later, a man was charged with her murder, convicted, and sentenced to death. In 2009 the Florida Supreme Court held that the evidence against him was legally insufficient and ordered a judgment of acquittal. In October 2026 he was back in court, asking for compensation, and an appeals court sent his petition back to the trial judge.
The Facts
Joanne Mazollo worked as a clerk at the Big Dollar pawn shop. On the morning of the murder, the owner, Gerald Singer, set up the store, then spoke to her by phone around 9:30 a.m., as was his routine. She told him she had arrived and everything was fine. Around 10:30 he called the shop several times and got no answer. He drove over and found her slumped in a chair in the back room. The medical examiner concluded she died from a single gunshot wound to the head and that her death was likely instantaneous.
Singer testified that between five and seven firearms were missing, that the cash drawer he had filled that morning was empty, and that about fifty envelopes of jewelry and a blue velvet Crown Royal bag of jewelry were gone from the safe.
Herman Lindsey was not charged until 2006. In October 1995 he had given police a taped statement naming another man, Ronnie LoRay. Lindsey said LoRay came to his house upset on the day of the robbery, said “they” had robbed a place, and had gold jewelry, a few hundred dollars and a gun. Lindsey admitted being in the store before the crime, admitted pawning a Sega game system there under a false name, and admitted he sometimes helped LoRay get rid of stolen merchandise. He denied taking part in the robbery.
The State’s other evidence, as the Supreme Court described it, included:
- Lindsey’s ex-wife testified that she later found a Crown Royal bag of jewelry in a closet of an apartment where she sometimes stayed with him, and that he eventually sold the jewelry at a flea market. Several other people, including LoRay, also lived at or had access to that apartment.
- A jailhouse witness, Mark Simms, testified that Lindsey, whom he met in jail in May 1994, told him he had once had to kill someone.
- LoRay’s fingerprint was found on a stun gun box in the back room of the shop, and Lindsey’s thumbprint was on a pawn slip dated March 31, 1994, under the name David Ashley, the name he used to pawn his game system.
- Witnesses said Lindsey had visited the shop before the murder, and the clerk appeared to know him.
The Ruling
Lindsey raised eighteen issues on appeal. The Court needed only one. Because the case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence, a special standard applied: the circumstances must lead “to a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the offense charged,” and evidence that is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence is not enough. The Court said the case was controlled by its earlier decision in Ballard v. State.
It reduced the State’s entire case to a short list and found it wanting. “No evidence shows,” the Court wrote, that the bag of jewelry in the closet was the bag taken from the shop, or that Lindsey put it there or ever had it before he sold the items. And “the State failed to produce any evidence in this case placing Lindsey at the scene of the crime at the time of the murder.” The evidence was “equally consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The Court added that even a “deep suspicion” is not enough to sustain a conviction.
The Court reversed, vacated the conviction and the death sentence, and directed that a judgment of acquittal be entered. All seven justices concurred; the Chief Justice, joined by two others, wrote separately.
A footnote in the opinion records that LoRay was arrested in December 2005, a few months before Lindsey was charged, and was at that time incarcerated for second-degree murder in Mazollo’s death and the robbery of the shop.
An acquittal ordered for insufficient evidence is not a finding that Lindsey was innocent. It is a holding that the State did not prove he did it.
The Compensation Petition
When the acquittal was entered in 2009, Lindsey could not apply for compensation for the time he spent in custody. On July 1, 2025, the Legislature amended sections 961.03 and 961.04, Florida Statutes. In the Fourth District’s words, the amended text “enables wrongfully convicted persons to seek compensation.” Three weeks later Lindsey filed a petition in Broward County under the amended law.
The State opposed it on four grounds: it was not under oath, it was filed more than 90 days after the conviction was vacated, it did not show verifiable and substantial evidence of actual innocence, and it did not describe that evidence with particularity. Lindsey filed a sworn amended petition with more evidence of innocence and argued his filing was timely because the 2025 amendments gave people in his position until July 1, 2027. The circuit court denied the petition anyway, relying on the arguments in the State’s response to the first petition, and apparently without addressing the amended one.
On appeal the State conceded the circuit court had erred by not following the procedures in section 961.03. On October 21, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal accepted the confession of error, reversed, and sent the case back so those procedures can be followed.
What the Court Did Not Decide
The panel did not decide whether Lindsey qualifies as a “wrongfully incarcerated person,” whether his evidence of innocence is sufficient, or whether his petition is timely. Lindsey also asked the court to expand the statutory definition of a wrongfully incarcerated person; the court declined to reach that request because it was reversing on another ground. The opinion states no compensation amount. The July 1, 2027 date comes from Lindsey’s own argument as the opinion describes it, not from a holding. The opinion is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is decided.
| Court (2009) | Supreme Court of Florida |
| Citation | 14 So. 3d 211 (Fla. 2009) |
| Case No. | SC07-1167 |
| Vote | All seven justices concurred; per curiam, with a separate concurrence |
| Court (2026) | Fourth District Court of Appeal |
| Case No. | 4D2025-3395 |
| Decided | October 21, 2026 (Judges Shaw, Forst and Shepherd) |
Primary sources: the 2009 Florida Supreme Court opinion and the 2026 Fourth District opinion. The trial record, the briefs and the compensation petition itself were not reviewed. This archive does not publish secondhand summaries.